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Dyson: Discrimination in the Workplace

COMMENT
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND
"SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION"
IN THE WORKPLACE:
DO WE NOW NEED A
WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH
WAY THE WIND BLOWS?
INTRODUCTION

Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward
is an employment discrimination action brought by a black professor denied tenure at Cal State Hayward. 1 The case turns on
the admission of the expert testimony of sociology professor Dr.
David Wellman, a racial-discrimination expert who analyzed
the disputed tenure decision according to eight criteria he had
developed for "decoding" white behavior.2 Initially, the case
resulted in a victory for the plaintiff, who was awarded
$637,000 in damages after a nine-day jury triaV On appeal,
however, the Ninth Circuit overturned the jury's verdict and
remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge
had failed to make the requisite reliability determination conElsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th
Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003).
2 Elsayed 299 F.3d at 1062. For an account of Dr. Wellman's qualifications, see
Appellee's Brief at 44-45, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward,
299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-15565).
For a discussion of Dr. Wellman's decoding methodology, see infra notes 120-128 and
accompanying text.
3 Id. at 1061.
1
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cerning Dr. Wellman's testimony.4 This was not harmless error, held the court, as without Dr. Wellman's testimony, the
case would reduce to "a mere difference of academic opinion" not a Title VII offense. 5
What is at stake here? From one point of view, a civil
rights plaintiff has been perversely robbed of a jury verdict because of a procedural nicety: "[A] panel of this court overturned
the jury's verdict because it believed that the district court had
not made a procedurally proper Daubert ruling. '" In doing so,
it acted in a manner contrary to all precedent ... "6 And yet,
much recent discourse on employment discrimination jurisprudence starts from the observation that the mainstream Title
VII cases invest heavily in procedure: "It is no secret that the
Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence cloaks substance in
the 'curious garb' of procedure. When the Supreme Court talks
about employment discrimination under Title VII, it generally
does so by creating and refining special proof structures - different methods of proving discrimination."7 In a general way,
this intense focus on procedure is understood to have come
about because discrimination is hard to prove - and never more
so than in the contemporary workplace, where it has become
subtle and covert, perhaps even largely unconscious:
AB traditional social norms permitting overt racism and segregation give way to a modern norm of egalitarianism, and as
well-defined, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures delineating
clear paths for advancement within institutions give way to a
globalized workplace of flexible governance and movement between institutions, discrimination often operates in the workplace today less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable
decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug on opportunity
and advancement. ... It creeps into everyday impressions of
worth and assignment of merit on the job, lurking constantly

, [d. at 1068. For a discussion of the reliability determination requirement as
established by the Daubert v. Merrell Dow line of cases, see infra notes 24-53 and accompanying text.
5 [d. at 1067-68.
6 Elsayed, amended, 319 F.3d at 1075 (Rheinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane). Eleven of the Ninth Circuit judges joined in this dissent. [d.
Thirteen votes were required for a rehearing. [d. at 1078.
7 Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment after Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2229-2231 (1995).
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behind even the most honest belief in equality, perpetuating
the very injustice that we decry.B

In the academic literature, such a characterization of subtle discrimination is likely to be reinforced by a proffer of social
science research. Thus, in a way, Elsayed seems like an inevitable moment in the trajectory of Title VII discrimination jurisprudence - like a plot point on a graph. Data indicate, argued Elsayed, "that while there is an increasing trend toward
verbal tolerance in relation to issues of race and racism, there
is a discrepancy between such statements and the routine everyday practices of white Americans. "9 Thus Dr. Wellman's
"specialized sociological knowledge" was helpful to the jury,
assisting them "to identify and to analyze coded expressions of
contemporary racism."IO
Legal scholar Michael Selmi points out that "a finding of
discrimination is ultimately a factual determination ... that
requires drawing an inference of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence."ll The Supreme Court crafted the special Title VII proof structures to facilitate the drawing of this
inference. 12 Yet, according to Selmi, "despite its rhetoric regarding the importance of ferreting out subtle discrimination,
the Court has only seen discrimination in the most overt or obvious situations - situations that could not be explained on any
basis other than race. "13 If the Court has failed to see subtle
discrimination despite its Title VII proof regime, legal scholar-

• Tristin K Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 MARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91 (2003).
9 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066 n.9.
I°Id.
11 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283 (1997). Michael Selmi, Professor of Law at
George Washington University School of Law, has made a significant contribution to
discrimination discourse. See, e.g., Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) and Testing for Equality: Merit,
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995), in addition to the two articles on which this Comment relies. See Seimi, infra note 14. This
Comment is heavily indebted to Professor Selmi's writings.
12 Selmi, supra
note 11, at 283. The proof reginIe for individual intentional
employment discrimination cases under Title VII was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
13 Selmi, supra note 11, at 284.
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ship has not. 14 The problem of subtle discrimination has generated a complex and nuanced discourse among legal scholars
and academics in the social sciences. ls Elsayed represents an
experiment in bringing this discourse into the courtroom to
educate judge and jury.
When subtle discrimination discourse comes to court,
though, another significant proof regime, the Daubert expert
testimony jurisprudence, comes into play. IS Under Daubert,
trial judges must operate as gatekeepers, assuring that no expert testimony reaches the jury unless shown to be both relevant and reliable. l7 Can the academic subtle discrimination
discourse pass muster under the Daubert regime? If it can, will
civil rights plaintiffs ultimately benefit from the admission of
subtle discrimination testimony by academics?
..
This Comment studies Elsayed in order to investigate
these questions. The Background discussion traces the two
great lines of cases whose trajectories cross in Elsayed, the
Daubert v. Merrell Dow expert testimony jurisprudence under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the McDonnell Douglas v.
Green line of cases establishing the "pretext" model of proof for
individual employment discrimination claims under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights ActY Then, turning to the opinion
proper, the Analysis considers Elsayed under the following
headings: (A) The Crux: The Court's Harmless-Error Determination,l9 (B) Decoding in the Pretext Context,2o (C) Substituting
the Mixed-Motives Regime under Costa for the Pretext Regime
under Reeves,21 (D) The Rehabilitation of Circumstantial Evidence in Desert Palace. 22

1. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather Than
Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.R. 657, 659 (2003) (exploring the perspective gap be-

tween scholars and the courts).
1.
16

Id.
Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063.

17 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993);
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,138 (1999).
18 See infra notes 24-98 and accompanying text.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 414 U.S. 792 (1973); 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
19 See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 120-173 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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Finally, based on this analysis, the Conclusion articulates
a qualified endorsement of the thirty-year-old McDonnell Douglas "pretext" proof regime for individual employment discrimination cases. 23
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE DAUBERT v. MERRELL Dow LINE OF CASES

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., decided in
1993, made federal judges gatekeepers with respect to expert
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.24 Before
Daubert, the reigning standard since 1923 had been the Frye
"general acceptance" test, predicating the admissibility of expert testimony on its acceptance in the relevant scientific community.25 The 1973 adoption of Rule 702, however, cast some
doubt on the continuing validity of Frye. 26 The new Rule governing expert testimony did not incorporate the venerable
"general acceptance" language of Frye, simply providing that "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise. "27 To resolve the doubt
that grew up around the unclear relationship between Frye and
Rule 702, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert in
1992.28

23 But see Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229, 2230-231. "The liberal legal community has sought - and claims to have found - a set of substantive judgments embedded
in the Court's procedural decisions. What is said to exist is a substantive consensus
that the eradication of discrimination is a high societal priority, and that discrimination is pervasive but difficult to prove .... When the Court's procedural decisions take a
conservative, pro-defendant turn, critics decry the departure from this substantive
consensus. These critiques nostalgically seek a return to what they deem the correct,
liberal past in which a deep societal commitment to the eradication of discrimination
shaped a plaintiff-friendly procedural jurisprudence." [d .
.. See Gordon Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45
AM. U.L. REv. 1, 31-33 (1995); John Jansonius and Andrew Gould, Expert Witnesses in
Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR
L. REv. 267, 277 (1998).
25 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (1923).
26 Jansonius and Gould, supra note 24, at 274-275.
27 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
28 Jansonius and Gould, supra note 24, at 275.
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In Daubert, a products liability case, the minor plaintiffs
claimed the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, used by their mothers
during pregnancy, had caused their birth defects. 29 The plaintiffs offered the testimony of eight well-qualified experts to establish that Bendectin caused their injuries, but the trial court
awarded summary judgment to the defendants. 30 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, ruling the plaintiffs' expert testimony inadmissible under Frye. 3l The Supreme Court, however, vacated
the summary judgment order and remanded the case, holding
that Frye's "general acceptance" test had been superseded by
the adoption of Rule 702.32 "[T]he trial judge must ensure," said
the Daubert court, "that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. "33 The Court
went on to formulate four general considerations to guide trial
judges in their newly conceived gatekeeping role: 1) whether
the expert's analysis derives from a scientific method that can
be or has been tested, 2) whether the expert's method has been
the subject of peer review and testing, 3) the actual or potential
rate of error in the expert's methodology, and 4) whether the
relevant scientific community generally accepts the expert's
methodology.34 Thus, "general acceptance," the sine qua non
under Frye, has dwindled to just one of four factors in a nonexhaustive list. 35
The expert testimony at issue in Daubert concerned scientific knowledge. The language of Rule 702, however, is more
inclusive, encompassing "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."36 Six years after the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another products liability
case, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, to resolve uncertainty among
the lower courts as to whether or how Daubert applied to nonscientific expert testimony.37

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
Daubert, 727 F.Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 989). See Jansonius and Gould, supra
note 24, at 276.
31 Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9'" Cir.).
32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 598.
33 Id. at 589.
34 Id. at 593.594.
35 Id. at 593. "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to
set out a definitive checklist or test." Id.
36 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
37 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae~ 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
29

30
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The Kumho plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident
when a tire blew out, offered the expert testimony of a tirefailure analyst in support of their claim against the tire manufacturer.38 The tire analyst used his own method of visual and
tactile inspection, inferring a manufacturing or design defect in
the absence of at least two of a set list of tire abuse symptoms
he had developed. 39 The trial court found this testimony inadmissible under the four-factor Daubert test. 40 On reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged that it initially applied
Daubert too mechanically; nevertheless, even under a flexible
application of the Daubert reliability test, the expert's methodology did not pass muster.41 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, remanding for non -Daubert proceedings after holding
that Daubert did not apply at all outside the realm of scientific
testimony.42
Addressing the confusion about Daubert's scope, the Supreme Court made clear that the trial judge's gatekeeping obligation under Daubert applies not only to testimony based on
"scientific" knowledge but also to testimony based on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. 43 Further, the gatekeeping function is to be performed flexibly.44 The Daubert factors are not exhaustive or definitive, and trial judges have leeway to determine not only whether expert testimony is reliable,
but also how to make the reliability determination. 45 While
trial judges enjoy broad discretion in the conduct of reliability
inquiries after Kumho, however, they do not have discretion to
abandon the obligation to conduct them. Justice Scalia underscored this in a separate concurrence in Kumho: "I join the
opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it
endorses - trial court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability - is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function."46
Kumlw, 526 u.s. at 142.
[d. at 144, 153-154.
'" [d. at 145. For four-factor test, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41 [d. at 145-146.
42 [d. at 146.
43 [d. at 141. "The initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping
obligation applies only to scientific testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the
parties, believe that it applies to all expert testimony." [d. at 146.
« [d. at 138 .
.. [d. at 152-153 .
.. [d. at 158-159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38
39

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4

44

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

A trio of recent court of appeals decisions delineate the
trial courts' post-Kumho obligation to make reliability determinations when expert testimony is proffered. In United States v.
Velarde, a child sexual abuse case, the Tenth Circuit reversed
and remanded where the trial judge had failed to conduct any
kind of reliability determination on the record before admitting
the testimony of a pediatrician and a child psychologist who
had treated the victim.47 "Well, I'm not going to hold a Daubert
hearing," said the judge. 48 "I've had this testimony before in
trials, and it's not new and novel."49 Distinguishing Velarde,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court in U.S. v. Alatorre,
noting that while the court had denied the defendant's request
for a Daubert hearing prior to trial, it did permit the defendant
to conduct a lengthy voir dire of the government's drug-crimes
expert during the trial, ultimately ruling on the relevance and
reliability of the government witness's testimony.5o And in U.S.
v. Hankey, the trial court conducted an extensive voir dire of
the government's police gang expert to assess the relevance
and reliability of his testimony, which was sufficient for the
Ninth Circuit to affirm.51 Though some sort of reliability determination is clearly required by Daubert jurisprudence, the
circuits are currently split on whether a failure to create a record of the reliability determination is an abuse of discretion.52
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2000 incorporated the holdings of Daubert and Kumho. 53 As amended,
Rule 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case." By spelling out the elements of a
"United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 120S (2000).
.. [d. at 120S
.9 [d.
00 United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 109S, 1104-1105 (2000) .
.. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 116S-1169 (2000).
52 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2142, 2161
n.S9 (2003).
63 [d. at 2144.
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proper Daubert inquiry - from data to principles and methods
to application - the Rule mandates activist gatekeepers, making it clear that no expert testimony, however seemingly familiar or arcane, will be permitted to pass by cloaking itself in the
outward signs of expertise.
B.

THE McDONNELL DOUGLAS v. GREEN LINE OF CASES

Though trial court judges must inquire into the relevance
and reliability of expert testimony under Daubert, they have
discretion concerning the manner of the inquiry.54 Clearly, the
Daubert inquiry will be shaped by context, the particular type
of case being tried. 55 In individual employment discrimination
cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, this shaping
context will be supplied by the McDonnell Douglas v. Green
line of cases, a jurisprudence already preoccupied with the
question of what constitutes reliable proof. 56

1.

Pretext Analysis, McDonnell Douglas through Reeves

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it an unlawful
employment practice "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. "57 In the seminal
McDonnell Douglas v. Green case, one of the first employment
discrimination cases to be decided under Title VII, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for proving intentional employment discrimination that remains vital today.58 Though
the proof structure established in this case has generally been
considered plaintiff-friendly in concept, in practice many seemingly deserving plaintiffs have been denied relief under the

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158-159.
See, e.g., Kumho, 526 U.S. at 139 (reviewing trial court's assessment of tirefailure analyst's testimony proffered in products liability case).
56 See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229-2230.
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2000).
58 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). See Selmi, supra
note 14, at 666 (assessing the model's continuing viability).
54

55
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McDonnell Douglas regime, an irony that has not gone unnoticed in the Title VII discourse. 59
In McDonnell Douglas, Percy Green, a civil-rights activist
and radio mechanic, was laid off from his job at the McDonnellDouglas plant in St. Louis Missouri in 1964.60 When the company rejected Green the following summer for an open mechanic's job for which he was clearly qualified, he filed an administrative action before the newly formed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging racial discrimination as well as retaliation for his civil rights activities. 61
In due course, his discrimination claim came before the Supreme Court, only the second case the Court had certified under Title VII.62
Declaring that Title VII "tolerates no racial discrimination,
subtle or otherwise," the Court identified the critical issue before it as concerning the order and allocation of proof. 63 Under
Title VII, a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in the workplace must first establish a prima facie case, showing that he
belongs to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified
for the position in question, that he was rejected despite his
qualifications, and that after his rejection the job stayed open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from among
similarly qualified individuals. 64 Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action. 65 If the employer is able to make this showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is a pretext. 66 Here, the Court found that
Green had made out his prima facie case, and that the com59 See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 7, at 2229; Selmi, supra note 11, at 324 .
.., McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 794. See David B. Oppenheimer,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green Revisited: Why Non-Violent Civil Disobedience
Should Be Protected from Retaliation by Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. LR 635, 636645 (2003) (placing this foundational case in historical context).
61 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 796.
The EEOC administers and enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990.29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-169l.
62 Oppenheimer, supra note 60, at 64l.
63 McDonnell Douglas Corp. 411 U.S. at 801,800.
54 Id. at 802. The Court acknowledges that differing factual situations will require some variation in the prima facie proof as specified here. Id. at 802 n.13.
65 Id .
.. Id. at 804.
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pany met its rebuttal burden with its claim that it refused to
hire Green solely because of his unlawful conduct against it.67
On remand, then, Green was to be "afforded a fair opportunity"
to show that the company's stated reason was in fact pretext. 68
If the employee can expose the employer's articulated reason as pretext, what then? In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
a series of disciplinary actions against Melvin Hicks, the only
African American among six shift commanders at a correctional institution, culminated in his discharge after a heated
exchange with his boss. 69 Hicks easily established his prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas: as an Mrican American,
he was a member of a protected class; he was qualified for his
position, as he had recently been promoted; and he was subject
to an adverse employment action in that he was demoted and
then discharged while the position remained open. 70 The burden shifted, then, to St. Mary's to articulate a legitimate reason
for Hick's termination. 71 St. Mary's cited the frequency and
severity of Hicks' offenses. 72 By producing evidence that similar and even more serious violations by his co-workers were
treated more leniently, Hicks made a classic showing of pretext. 73 Under some earlier Title VII decisions, this would have
been enough to establish unlawful employment discrimination. 74 The Hicks court, however, ruled that a rmding of pretext
permits but does not compel the inference of intentional discrimination, leaving open the ultimate question of discrimination. 75
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, an age discrimination case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to correct an overly restrictive reading of Hicks, resolving a conflict

67 [d. at 802, 803. Note that "unlawful conduct" here signifies nonviolent civil
rights demonstrations that Mr. Green participated in. [d. at 803-804.
58 [d. at 804.
69 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-505 (1993).
See Seimi,
supra note 11, at 328-334 (placing Hicks in the disparate treatment employment discrimination jurisprudence).
70 Selmi, supra note 11, at 329.
71 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Selmi, supra note 11, at 329.
72 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Selmi, supra note 11, at 329.
73 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508; Seimi, supra note 11, at 329.
" Selmi, supra note 11, at 330.
,. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4

48

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

among the circuits. 76 The question before the Court in Reeves
was whether a finding of liability for intentional discrimination
can be sustained by a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation
for its decision. 77 Shoddy recordkeeping was the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason the employer articulated for firing
Reeves. 78 Though Reeves was able to establish that this reason
was pretext, the Fifth Circuit overturned the lower court's
damages award, explaining that establishing pretext did not
dispose of the ultimate issue of discrimination, as the plaintiff
had further to establish that his age actually motivated the
adverse employment action. 79
The Supreme Court disagreed: "Proof that the defendant's
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive .... Moreover, once the
employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination
may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially
since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual
reason for its decision."80 In Reeves, the Court seems to have
gone some distance in rehabilitating two propositions identified
by Michael Selmi as crucial to the vitality of the McDonell
Douglas regime: "that employers are generally able to offer explanations for their actions ... and that when employers are
unable to provide a convincing explanation for their actions, a
court may infer that the true reason was discrimination."81
Most individual employment discrimination plaintiffs rely
on circumstantial evidence and the pretext analysis developed
under McDonnell Douglas. 82 Since 1989, however, plaintiffs
offering direct evidence of discrimination have been able to
avail themselves of an alternative to the pretext analysis, argu-

76 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 140, 146-147 (2000).
Though age is not one of the protected classifications under Title VII, the Court explicitly applies the McDonnell Douglas framework. [d. at 142.
77 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 139, 146-147.
78 [d. at 138.
79 [d. at 146.
80 [d. at 147.
81 Selmi, supra note 11, at 325-326.
82 [d. at 283.
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ing "mixed motives" under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 83 And
since the 2003 Desert Palace v. Costa decision, direct evidence
is no longer required to argue mixed motives. 84

2. The Mixed-Motive Cases, Price Waterhouse through Desert
Palace
A fascinating offshoot of the McDonnell Douglas line of
cases, the "mixed-motive" branch, has produced especially confusing and complex rulings. Instead of arguing that the employer's justification for an adverse employment action is pretextual, a mixed-motives plaintiff argues that the adverse action was partly motivated by an illegal criterion. 85 In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the seminal mixed-motive case, the
Court considered whether an adverse employment action was
taken "because of' sex where both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons played a part in the decision. 86 The Court concluded
that the employer could avoid liability by proving that it would
have come to the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to playa role, but the Justices were badly divided over the
question of when the burden shifts to the employer to establish
this affirmative defense. 87
In 1991, two years after the Price Waterhouse ruling, Congress amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, setting forth standards for mixed-motive cases. 88 Under the 1991 amendments,
an employee establishes an unlawful employment practice by
demonstrating that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 89 The employer has a limited affirmative
83 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) .
.. Desert Palace v. Costa, Inc., 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
85 See Christopher Chen, Rethinking the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motive Discrimination Claims, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 899 (2001). "In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States Supreme Court
augmented the existing framework for establishing employer liability in disparate
treatment discrimination claims. This decision recognized the shortcomings of pretext
analysis as outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, and enunciated mixed-motives analysis which enables plaintiffs
to hold employers liable whenever an illegitimate criterion, such as race, sex, or national origin, is a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision." [d .
.. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-240.
87 [d. at 244. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90.
88 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91.
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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defense under the new provisions, restricting remedies but not
removing liability, if it can show that it would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivation. 90
The 1991 amendments to Title VII did not entirely
straighten out the mixed-motive jurisprudence descended from
Price Waterhouse. Relying on Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse, a number of circuits have held
that direct evidence of discrimination is required to establish
liability under the 1991 provisions. 91 In a sex discrimination
case arising in the Ninth Circuit in 2002, however, the Supreme Court provided much-needed clarity and simplification.92
Agreeing with the appeals court that the enactment of the 1991
amendments abrogated Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse
references to direct evidence, the Court in Desert Palace v.
Costa turned to the language of the statute itself.93 Finding no
requirement in the statute for a heightened showing in mixedmotive employment discrimination cases, the Court held that
in order to obtain a jury instruction under the 1991 provisions,
the plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by preponderance of the evidence, that
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice. "94 The Court went beyond
the immediate holding in Desert Palace to rehabilitate circumstantial evidence in general in Title VII cases: ''We have often
acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. ... The reason for treating circumstantial
evidence and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep-rooted
"95

In sum, both the Daubert expert testimony line of cases
and the McDonnell Douglas employment discrimination line of
cases are actively evolving, with significant decisions emerging
in each line within the last few years. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael was decided in 1999, and the circuits are currently split
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91.
92 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90. "The question before us in this case is whether a
plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixedmotive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). We hold that direct evidence is not required." Id.
93 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93-94 .
.. Id. at 95-96 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) .
.. Id. at 94.
00
9'
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concerning the implications of its reliability determination requirement. 96 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, revitalizing the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, was decided in 2000, the
same year the Kumho holding was incorporated by amendment
into Evidence Rule 702.97 The Desert Palace ruling came down
just last year, opening the way for mixed-motives cases based
on circumstantial evidence. 98 This complex and shifting background is largely what makes Elsayed Mukhtar v. California
State University, Hayward worth examining.

II.

ANALYSIS

As a matter of legal precedent, Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cali-

fornia State University, Hayward is not a significant case. It
can be cited only for the relatively narrow proposition that the
trial court commits reversible error when it admits expert testimony without making a Daubert reliability determination on
the record. 99 Nevertheless, situated as it is at the juncture of
two active fault lines of cases, the Elsayed opinion provides a
good site for analysis, yielding rich material for critical speculation. The question most immediately presented is whether
the academic "subtle discrimination" discourse has a future in
the courtroom.
A.

THE CRUX: THE COURT'S HARMLESS-ERROR DETERMINATION

Daubert doctrine requires the trial judge, as gatekeeper
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to ensure that all expert
testimony admitted is not only relevant but reliable. lOo The
gatekeeping inquiry is a flexible one and must be tied to the
96 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2142, 21442147 (2003).
97 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133; Fed. R. Evid. 702. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing Reeves' place in Title VII individual employment discrimination jurisprudence).
98 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 90. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text
(placing Desert Palace in Title VII individual employment discrimination jurisprudence); infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text (discussing substitution of Desert
Palace for Reeves as Elsayed's McDonnell Douglas authority).
99 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068.
"[T]he district court's erroneous admission of Dr.
Wellman's testimony without the proper reliability determination was not harmless,
and CSUH is entitled to a new trial." [d.
100 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147.
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facts of the particular case.lO l Though the trial court has a
great deal of latitude in deciding how to conduct the gatekeeping inquiry, it does not have the latitude to abandon the obligation altogether. 102 In Elsayed, the trial court evinced awareness
of its Daubert obligations, ordering both parties to produce
Daubert briefs before ruling on the defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Wellman's testimony.103 Before admitting the testimony, the court reviewed two briefs by the defendants and
three briefs by the plaintiff, as well as two declarations from
Dr. Wellman, excerpts from Wellman's deposition, his preliminary report, and his curriculum vitae. 1M Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit found the trial court had abdicated its gatekeeping role because it failed to make a reliability determination on
the record before admitting Wellman's testimony.l05 "[T]he only
indication we have that the district court found Dr. Wellman's
testimony reliable is the fact that it was admitted over CSUH's
reliability objections. Surely Daubert and its progeny require
more. "106
The circuits are currently split as to whether the failure to
make a record of the reliability finding constitutes an abuse of
discretion. 107 Here, the court cited two other Ninth Circuit
cases in which expert testimony was admitted only after extensive voir dire of the witness, as well as a Tenth Circuit case
where the district court was overturned for failing to make any
sort of reliability determination. lOS Thus far, the court seems to
be on relatively solid ground. Requiring a formal reliability
finding of some kind seems in keeping with Kumho, which emphasizes the flexibility of the Daubert inquiry but also reaffirms the importance of the gatekeeping function. l09

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
[d. at 152, 158-159.
103 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1064.
104 [d. at 1064.
105 [d. at 1066.
106 [d.
107 See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2142, 2161
n.89 (2003).
108 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066.
109 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
101

102
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A trial court's failure to make a reliability determination is
reversible error, however, only if it is not harmless - that is, if
it is more probably than not the cause of the outcome. 110 Here,
the court held the error was not harmless:
Dr. Wellman drew the inference of discrimination for the jury
in a case otherwise based entirely on less-than-convincing circumstantial evidence. Thus it is hard for us to see how Dr.
Wellman's testimony, which addressed the central issue ofEIsayed's case, was harmless; rather it "more probably than not
was the cause of the result reached."lll

This is a surprising statement. Not only did the Elsayed
jury find unlawful employment discrimination in the University's tenure denial, they also awarded punitive damages. 1l2 To
award punitive damages, the jury had to attribute conscious
discrimination to the decision makers in Elsayed's tenure
case. 1l3 This was not an inference drawn for the jury by Dr.
Wellman, whose testimony centered on "subtle discrimination"
- that is to say, largely unconscious discriminationY4 Thus,
the court's sweeping dismissal of all the other evidence in the
case as less-than-convincing circumstantial evidence, llS indicating at most a mere difference of academic opinion, llS seems unwarranted.
What is more, insofar as Dr. Wellman did draw the inference of discrimination for the jury, he drew this inference from
the same set of facts that was before the jury, evidence the
Ninth Circuit characterizes as "less-than-convincing circumstantial evidence."117 It is hard to see how a convincing inference can be drawn from unconvincing evidence. Though the
court claims not to express an opinion on the merits of
Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066.
Id. at 1068 (quoting Jauregi v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1133 (1988».
112 Id. at 1061.
113 Id at 1068 n.15.
114 See Appellee's Brief at 44-45, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University,
Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 0115565). "The university portrayed Dr. Rees as an advocate of diversity. Dr. Wellman's
decades of research decoding subtle racism assisted the jury in understanding that you
do not have to be a bigot to make an employment decision on such impermissible factors as race and religion." Id.
115 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068.
116Id. at 1067.
117 Id. at 1068.
110

111
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Wellman's testimony or on its reliability,US it is not hard to infer one from this statement. The error is harmful only on the
premise that Dr. Wellman's testimony is actually inadmissible;
otherwise the substantial rights of the parties are unaffected
by the trial court's error. U9 Implicitly, the court here decided
on the admissibility of Dr. Wellman's testimony under cover of
ruling on the mere formality of the trial court's failure to make
a proper record. Thus, in order to predict how Dr. Wellman's
testimony will fare on retrial and, more generally, how subtle
discrimination testimony will fare in Title VII employment discrimination cases under the Daubert expert testimony requirements, we must ferret out and make explicit what the
court states only indirectly.
B.

DECODING IN THE PRETEXT CONTEXT

1.

The Decoding Methodology: Dr. Wellman's Testimony

On direct examination at trial, Dr. Wellman summarized
his qualifications, described his assignment and the materials
he reviewed for the case, explained the criteria he developed
through his research to detect the presence of racial factors in
decision-making, and applied the criteria to the facts of the
case. 120 Dr. Wellman explained that he systematically investigates the racial worldview of Americans, conducting a type of
qualitative research related to anthropological-ethnographic
methods. 121 The results of such research are not quantifiable,
he explained, as the method focuses on the actor's understanding of the world and attempts to get inside people's thinking.122
Relying on in-depth interviews, focus groups, ethriographic obliB

[d. at 1068 n.12

The dissent from the court's denial of an en banc hearing argues that the majority has misapplied the harmless error rule: "The district court's 'error' could have
affected the verdict in a way that was prejudicial to the State University only if the
testimony the jury heard could not have been admitted by means of a proper procedural ruling. In the absence of a determination that the expert testimony did not qualify for admission under Daubert, its admission cannot be deemed to have constituted
'harmful' error or to have affected the substantial rights of the parties." Elsayed,
amended, 319 F.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original).
120 Appellee's Brief at 55, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9 th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 0115565).
121 [d. at 46.
122 [d.
119
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servation, and institutional document review, the methodology
can be tested for validity, reliability and reproducibility.123
In the course of his research, Dr. Wellman developed eight
criteria, or "alarm bells," for detecting the presence of race as a
hidden factor in decision making. 124 Dr. Wellman explained
that he uses these criteria in the classroom to help his sociology
students see the discrepancies between stated principles and
everyday practices when it comes to race. 125 He also uses them
regularly in lectures, finding them "effective in helping Americans understand practices that otherwise would go unnoticed."126 Applying his criteria to the facts of the Elsayed case,
Dr. Wellman gave it as his opinion that "race played a very important factor in the decision to deny Professor Elsayed tenure."127
Dr. Wellman's application of his eight decoding criteria to
the tenure decision is set forth in the opinion as follows:
a. The University's justification for denying tenure lacked
"credence";
b. Tenure criteria were applied inconsistently;
c. Inconsistent tenure criteria advantaged whites and disadvantaged blacks;
d. Tenure criteria shifted when challenged;
e. Statistical evidence showed disparate treatment;
f. Procedural violations occurred in the tenure process;
g. University officials trivialized and dismissed Elsayed's
qualifications and accomplishments; and
h. University officials failed to follow procedures for reducing racial inequality.128
Anyone versed in the McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence
will likely be struck by the seeming familiarity of Dr.
Wellman's criteria. Comparative treatment of blacks and
whites, including statistical evidence, grounds for the tenure
decision that shift under challenge, procedural irregularities in
the tenure process - such evidence goes to the classic "pretext"

Id.
Id. at 48.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 55.
128 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1062.
123
124
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analysis under McDonnell Douglas. 129 Even some of the particular terms Dr. Wellman uses - lack of credence, disparate
treatment - are salient as terms of art in Title VII jurisprudence. "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination," said the Reeves court,
explaining the reasoning from pretext under the McDonnell
Douglas regime, "and it may be quite persuasive."130 As a sociology professor studying racial discrimination since the seventies,l3l Dr. Wellman has very likely been influenced by the significant Title VII legal opinions and the writing of legal scholars, adopting and adapting legal evidence-processing schemes
to his own purposes.
This mirroring between Title VII jurisprudence and Dr.
Wellman's methodology creates some curious difficulties in the
courtroom under the Daubert regime and the Federal Rules
governing admissibility of expert testimony. Issues arise under
both the relevance and the reliability prongs of the Daubert
doctrine, and the court's skepticism toward the enterprise of
drawing the inference of discrimination from circumstantial
evidence, implicit in its harmless error determination, ultimately implicates Dr. Wellman's testimony along with all the
other evidence in the case.

2.

The Methodology Encounters the Rules

a. The Relevance Requirement under Evidence Rule 702 and
Daubert
Expert opinion evidence is admissible under Rule 702 if it
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.132 This helpfulness requirement, encompassed in the Daubert relevance determination, is the central concern of Rule 702, according to the Elsayed court. 133 Noting that the relevance issue was not properly before it, as defendants conceded in oral argument that Dr. Wellman's testi129 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
See Selmi, supra note 11, at 666-668
(applying McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to the case of a black law professor).
130 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
131 Appellee's Brief at 44.
132 Fed. Rule Evid. 702 (2000).
133 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063 n.7.
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mony was "absolutely" relevant,l34 the court nevertheless carefully bracketed the issue in two substantive footnotes citing
extensive authority.13s
If the case is retried, this issue may well be resurrected.
The defendants pressed the point vigorously in their appellate
brief, despite having apparently conceded the issue at trial. 136
The plaintiff took the position that Dr. Wellman's testimony
helped the jury in analyzing "coded expressions of contemporary racism."137 Ferreting out subtle discrimination, however,
is essentially what the McDonnell Douglas proof regime is designed to do, and the pretext analysis under Title VII is no less
applicable to contemporary racism than it was to the facts of
Percy Green's case in McDonnell Douglas. 13s The jury in this
case did in fact receive jury instructions based on pretext
analysis. 139 Since Dr. Wellman's decoding method significantly
resembles McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, the question
arises whether Wellman's application of his method to the evidence in the case was not simply redundant in the courtroom
and thus not helpful to the trier of fact.
b. The Reliability Requirement under Evidence Rule 702 and
Daubert
The reliability analysis produces even more vexed results
than the relevance inquiry. What emerges is that, in order to
pass the as-applied reliability test under Rule 702 and the
Daubert regime, Dr. Wellman's testimony must come perilously
close to violating the rule against drawing legal conclusions for
the jury.

[d. (quoting Defendants).
[d. at 1063 n.7, 1066 n.9.
136 Appellant's Opening Brief at 41-43, Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 319 F.3d 1073 (9 th Cir. 2003)
(No. 01-15565).
137 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1066 n. 9.
138 See Selmi, supra note 11, at 290.
139 Appellants' Opening Brief at 43.
134
135

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4

58

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

i.
Admissibility of ultimate issue testimony: Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference is not inadmissible because it embraces an ultimate
issue of fact.140 An ultimate issue of law, however, is another
matter; an expert witness may not give an opinion as to a legal
conclusion. 141 Here, in the context of ruling against the plaintiff
on the standard for review, the court stated that the trial court
clearly admitted Dr. Wellman's testimony subject to this prohibition against legal conclusions, and also that Wellman stayed
within the permitted parameters with his testimony.142 Subsequently, however, the court exposed the uncertainty underlying
the trial court's decision to admit the testimony, quoting the
trial court's analysis in full:
Well, I see Wellman and [CSUH's expert witnesses on EIsayed's academic qualifications] as essentially parallel, and I
would prefer that none of them express their own opinion
about whether this decision was right or wrong. But if any of
them are going to, then I guess all of them have to. And since
both sides have prepared on the basis that they all will, I suppose you would prefer that I let all of them do it, rather than
downplay as much as possible any of them substituting their
judgment for what the jury ultimately has to find, which is
whether, in fact, this decision was based on race discrimination or based on legitimate academic concerns. They each
have their own opinion, which is essentially what the jury will
have to decide, so I don't exactly know how we're going to
avoid having each of them go through all of the evidence and
essentially deliberate as jurors and argue about which - what
means what and what factor goes which way. It's not really
appropriate, so I guess we'll just have to try to keep it as brief
as possible, in Dr. Wellman's case, on general factors that
would lead to such decisions, and likewise in [CSUH expert's]
case, on general factors that would lead to such decisions, as
opposed to their trying to convince the jury of their own view

14. Fed. Rule Evid. 704(a) (1984).
McHugh v. United Servo Auto. Ass'n., 164 F.3d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1999).
142 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1063. At issue here was whether defendants' motion in
limine was sufficient to preserve their objection to Dr. Wellman's testimony, making
contemporaneous objection unnecessary and thus warranting review under the abuse
of discretion standard rather than for plain error. [d.
141
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of what the truth is of what the underlying state of mind was.
So that's about all the guidance I can give on that. 143

The court quoted this passage ostensibly to establish that
the lower court made no reliability determination. 144 What is
most evident, though, is the difficulty the trial judge had in
locating the line between ultimate issue of fact and legal conclusion in the type of testimony being proffered. 145
In the event, Dr. Wellman did not hew to "general factors
that would lead to such decisions"; rather, he applied his eight
criteria for decoding white behavior to the particular facts of
the university's tenure decision in Dr. Elsayed's case. 146 Since
Dr. Wellman's decoding criteria do the same kind of work as
the McDonnell Douglas proof regime, under which discrimination is established by exposing an employer's justification for
an adverse action as pretext, Wellman surely came close to
reaching a legal conclusion when he applied his criteria. It is
not hard to understand the uncertainty expressed in the lower
court's analysis of the defendants' exclusion motion. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit opinion itself seems internally inconsistent
on this point: in deciding an initial matter, the court held that
Wellman's testimony stayed on the right side of the ultimate
facti legal conclusion boundary,147 and yet ultimately the court
concluded that "Dr. Wellman drew the inference of discrimination for the jury. "148
Perhaps the key to the difficulty here is that there are no
elements to an employment discrimination cause of action under McDonnell Douglas. 149 Legal scholar John Valery White
posits that the McDonnell Douglas court deliberately created
an empty structure, purposefully avoiding any definition of either discrimination or the protected categories under Title VII,

1<" Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1064-1065. I have not included the entire passage quoted
by the Court.
... Id. at 1065.
• 45 The academic experts' testimony was apparently not contested and is not memorialized in the opinion. It might have made a useful point of comparison .
• 48 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1062 .
• <7 Id. at 1063. See supra note 128 .
• 48 Id. at 1068 .
• 49 John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law:
Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law. 53 MERCER L.REV. 709, 797
(2002).
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so that the law could accommodate the many forms of both.l50
Instead of a cause of action with elements, there is an evidenceordering device. This blurs the line between issues of fact and
issues of law. "For better or for worse, the Court in McDonnell
Douglas seemed to want the fact-finder to be king, transforming all questions into at least mixed questions of law and
fact."l5l Thus, in drawing the inference of discrimination, Dr.
Wellman was truly taking away the jury's work, leaving nothing further for the factfinder to do.
ii.
Kumho's Catch-22: If Dr. Wellman's testimony did cross
the line between ultimate fact issue and legal conclusion, could
he have avoided this by sticking to "general factors," as the
trial court suggested in giving guidance on the issue?l52 The
2000 amendments to Evidence Rule 702 specify that, in addition to sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods, the admissibility of expert testimony depends on the reliable application of the witness's principles and methods to the
facts of the case. l53 In Kumho Tire, which centered on the reliability of a tire-failure analyst's testimony, the Court made
clear that the reasonableness of the expert's method in general
would not suffice to establish the admissibility of his testimony.l54 For the testimony to be admissible under Daubert and
the evidence rules, what had to be established was the reasonableness of the expert's particular method of gathering and
analyzing data in order to reach a conclusion on the particular
matter to which his testimony was relevant. l55 "The relevant
issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the
cause of this tire's separation."l56

[d. at 720.
[d.
152 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1065.
153 Fed. Rule of Evid. 702 (2000). Note that the case was tried in September 2000,
before these amendments became effective. See Fed. Rule of Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A;
Appellee's Brief at 30. However, Kumho, a 1999 decision, imposes this requirement,
and the amendments apparently represent an incorporation of existing law rather than
a departure from it. See Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARv. L. REV.
2142, 2144 (2003).
1M Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-154.
155 [d. at 154.
156 [d. Emphasis in original.
150
151
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Thus, on the one hand, Dr. Wellman's testimony was in
danger of impinging on the jury's province and reaching a legal
conclusion if it didn't limit itself to general factors 157 -- but on
the other hand, the testimony was apparently in danger of being found unreliable if it didn't go beyond general factors to
determine the cause of this particular adverse employment action. The Elsayed court makes clear that the reliability determination the trial court failed to make was not a matter of Dr.
Wellman's qualifications. 158 "[T]he issue left unresolved at trial
was whether his research and opinions were sufficiently reliable so that the trial judge would permit him to apply his theories to the facts and tell the jury that Dr. Rees' decision must
have been racially motivated."159 If Dr. Rees' decision was racially motivated, then she has unlawfully discriminated
against Dr. Elsayed under Title VII. To pass the as-applied
reliability test under Kumho, Dr. Wellman needed to draw the
inference for the jury, usurping its function as factfinder.
When the Kumho expert drew the inference of defect, he testified to an ultimate fact, in order to establish an element of the
products liability cause of action. But in an intentional discrimination action under Title VII, there are no elements and
there is only one ultimate fact, the fact of discrimination itself.

3.

Drawing the Inference from Circumstantial Evidence

Both Dr. Wellman's decoding methodology and the standard pretext analysis under McDonnell Douglas proceed by
drawing the inference of discrimination from circumstantial
evidence. 16o Delivering its harmless error determination, the
Elsayed court characterizes the evidence in the case, aside from
Wellman's testimony, as "less-than-convincing circumstantial
evidence. "161 This raises the question - a constant theme in
Title VII jurisprudence and the legal scholarship - of what it
takes for circumstantial evidence to be convincing where discrimination is concerned.
Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1065.
Id at 1066 n.ll. "Indeed, his curriculum vitae is quite impressive," says the
court.ld.
159 Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074.
160 Appellee's Brief at 48; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804.
161 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1068.
157

1M
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Michael Selmi points out that the McDonnell Douglas
proof model is essentially binary: "Within the framework developed by the Court in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny,
once an employer articulates the reason for its decision, the
legal battle becomes one between discrimination, on the one
hand, and the employer's asserted rationale on the other."162
The first stage of the proof regime - the prima facie case achieves this binary construct by introducing race into the
process as a possible explanation for the employment decision
and eliminating the two most likely alternative explanations,
that there was no job available or that the candidate was unqualified. 163 In conducting the discrimination inquiry under
this construct, a court is not concerned with the real reason for
the contested action in an absolute sense, but rather with
whether discrimination can be established under the standard
of proof for a civillawsuit. 164
Kumho once more provides an instructive comparison.
Kumho turned on the reliability of expert testimony based on
circumstantial evidence, but in the products liability context. 16S
Where there was no direct evidence of a defect in the tire that
caused the plaintiffs' accident, a tire failure expert, using his
own method of visual and tactile inspection, drew the inference
of defect in the absence of at least two of a set list of four tire
abuse symptoms he had developed. 166 Like the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis, the tire expert's method sets up a
binary proposition initially: under the Kumho construct, if not
abuse, then defect; under the McDonnell Douglas construct, if
not the employer's proffered justification, then discrimination.
Both are essentially presumption-driven. If abuse is disproved,
then defect stands; if employer justification is disproved, then
discrimination stands. "A prima facie case .. , raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if
See Selmi, supra note 11, at 326.
[d. at 324-325.
164 [d. at 327.
165 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-154.
166 [d. at 144, 154. "Nor was the basis for Carlson's conclusion simply the general
theory that, in the absence of evidence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a
tire's separation. Rather, the expert employed a more specific theory to establish the
existence (or absence) of such abuse. Carlson testified precisely that in the absence of
at least two of four signs of abuse ... he concludes that a defect caused the separation."
[d. at 154.
162

163
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otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors."167
The limitation of the analogy, and the point of the comparison, lies in the crucial difference between the founding presumptions of these two interpretive devices. Whereas the presumption of defect in tire-failure analysis is quite innocuous,
merely a matter of empirical plausibility, the discrimination
presumption in the legal analysis of employment decisions is
highly charged, a matter of our continuing relationship to and
experience of our own history of racial oppression. According to
Selmi, this presumption is essential to the McDonnell Douglas
regime: "[T]he entire McDonnell Douglas proof structure was
premised on a belief in the power of discrimination as an explanatory variable - a belief that is central to the Court's entire
antidiscrimination doctrine."I68 Clearly, it is not circumstantial
evidence per se that is the problem. Insofar as the use of circumstantial evidence seems unobjectionable and commonsensical in the Kumho products liability context - but suspect
and difficult in the discrimination context - perhaps this is because, as Selmi suggests, the presumption of discrimination
has lost its explanatory power. 169
This is where Dr. Wellman's testimony comes in.
Wellman's testimony can be seen as an attempt to resettle pretext analysis - of which his decoding methodology can now be
seen as a variant - on a new empirical foundation supplied by
his ethnographic studies of the racial attitudes of white Americans. To make the preliminary presumption of discrimination
more persuasive, Dr. Wellman would substitute explicit sociological information for the implicit historical consciousness underlying Title VII pretext analysis.
Can such a project ultimately succeed in the courtroom,
assuming subtle discrimination testimony can gain admission
under the relevance and reliability requirements? The answer
to this question is, of course, purely speculative. That beliefs
can be impervious to information, however, is well known.
Here, the jury clearly saw something different from what the
appeals court saw, having made an award of damages that sugFurnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Selmi, supra note 11, at 328.
169 [d. at 283-284.

167
168
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gests they saw more than what Dr. Wellman showed them. 170
The court, on the other hand, was not persuaded. l71 The court - at best carelessly and at worst disingenuously -- set Dr.
Wellman's testimony over against the rest of the evidence in
the case and dismissed this artificial remainder as less-thanWhat you believe is
convincing circumstantial evidence.
largely what you see - or, as Michael Selmi has said, it's a matter of perspective: "[T]he difficulty of proving subtle discrimination does not stem principally from its unconscious nature, but
rather from the gap in perspectives that exists between African
Americans and whites over the continued relevance of discrimination."172 Something like this gap, as Selmi also points
out, has stubbornly and persistently divided legal academics
from the courts in individual employment discrimination cases
under Title VII.173
C.

SUBSTITUTING THE MIXED-MoTIVES REGIME UNDER COSTA
FOR THE PRETEXT REGIME UNDER REEVES

The actual deployment of the Title VII proof structure is
almost perfunctory in Elsayed, taking up just one paragraph
toward the end of the opinion. "To establish racial discrimination in the employment context, Elsayed must demonstrate
that the reason CSUH gave for denying Elsayed tenure - lack
of scholarly achievement - is a mere pretext for illegal racial
discrimination."174 Since we've heard this before, or something
170 See Erin Texeira, The Subtle Clues to Racism A white sociologist's nine [sic]
criteria for spotting veiled bias become key to a lawsuit over tenure. Hanging in the
balance is a black professor's career. Los ANGELES TIMES, January 11, 2001. This
news-feature account of Dr. Wellman's testimony and the jurors' reactions is truly
intriguing - and utterly inconclusive. According to the report, the jury foreman, Daniel
Coppock, said Dr. Wellman was "probably the best witness on either side. He gelled
the case for everyone." [d. Coppock said further that Wellman's "theories of hidden
racism" didn't work until he applied them to himself, reflecting on the times he'd feared
a black man on the street, despite his tolerant upbringing. [d. But Coppock then went
on to say he thought the university administrators were biased against Professor Elsayed not because he is black but because he conducts research on militant Muslim
communities - religious politics. [d. Other jurors reported feeling the university administrators came across in their testimony as smug, sure of victory - and the defendants' lawyer said she felt the jurors had found Elsayed "more personable" than her
clients. [d.
171 "We are not persuaded." Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067.
172 Selmi, supra note 11, at 663.
173 [d. at 659-660.
174 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067.
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very like it, in the preceding consideration of Wellman's "decoding" testimony, the actual Title VII rhetoric seems merely an
attenuated echo. But when the opinion was amended in February of 2003, a very suggestive substitution occurred in this
paragraph: "To establish racial discrimination in the employment context, Elsayed must demonstrate that CSUH denied
him tenure 'because of his race. While race need not be the sole
factor in CSUH's decision, it must be a 'motivating factor.'"175
At this juncture, the Costa v. Desert Palace mixed-motive case
is substituted for the Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing pretext
case as the authority supplied by the court under Title VII.176
The opinion in Costa v. Desert Palace, a gender discrimination case, was filed in the Ninth Circuit just five days before
Elsayed. 177 Like Professor Elsayed, plaintiff Catharina Costa
won a jury verdict; unlike Elsayed, Costa prevailed on appeal.
The U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Thomas writing, unanimously affirmed the judgment in Costa's favor in June of
2003. 178 This decision has generally been greeted with qualified
excitement by the plaintiffs' employment discrimination bar
and with some consternation by employers' attorneys.179 In Desert Palace, the Court settled a long-running debate among the
circuits, finding that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination in order to prevail in a "mixed-motive"
employment discrimination case under Title VII.180 All that is
required is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any adverse
action by an employer. lSI

175 Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074 (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299
F.3d 838 - slip op. at 10993 (9th Cir. 2002».
176 Elsayed, 299 F.3d at 1067; Elsayed as amended, 319 F.3d at 1074.
th
177 Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838 (9
Cir. 2002).
178 Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96 (2003).
179 See Mark Spognardi, Supreme Court Opens Gates to Plaintiff "Mixed·Motive"
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR AND BENEFITS
NEWSLETTER,
13:3
(September
2003)
at
http://www.hkiaw.comJPublications/Newsletter.asp? ID=394& Artlcle=2270; Shannon
P. Duffy, High Court Paves Easier Road to Jury for Discrimination Plaintiffs, THE
LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(June
11,
2003)
at
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=10524408674001
lao Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. at 90.
181 Id. at 94-95.
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This short, unanimous opinion, clearly reasoned and
plainly written, seems like a sudden release into straightforwardness and good sense after all the convolutions of the
thirty-year-old Title VII employment discrimination jurisprudence. In the abstract and intuitively, it would seem easier to
show that race or gender, for example, was one motivating factor among others than to establish that it was the one true reason masquerading behind a pretextual justification for an employment action. Thus, it is tempting to speculate that mixedmotive cases will become the preferred vehicle for plaintiffs
alleging employment discrimination, now that the artificial
hobble of the direct evidence requirement has been removed.
Indeed, this was a prospect that worried the Ninth Circuit dissenters:
[A]part from our duty to abide by precedent, policy concerns
favor adhering to Justice O'Connor's view of mixed motives
analysis. ... To keep the mixed motive framework from overriding in all cases the McDonnell Douglas rule and the pretext requirement, which it clearly was not meant to do, mixed
motive analysis properly is available only in a special subset
of cases. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
meets this need: It requires the plaintiff to produce highly
probative, direct evidence before she may utilize the more lenient, mixed motives test. As a practical matter, without this
or some similar constraint on when a plaintiff may invoke the
mixed motives test, any plaintiff would opt for the Hopkins
framework to avoid having to show pretext. 182

This language is striking for its ruthless practicality:
"without this or some other similar constraint" suggests that
the content of the constraint is a matter of relative indifference,
so long as whatever it is truly works to keep the mixed-motives
framework from overrunning the McDonnell Douglas regime
and, by implication, the employment discrimination plaintiffs
from flooding into the courtS. 183 If the dissenters are right
Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838 at 867. (Gould, J., dissenting).
Counterbalancing the perceived lenience of the mixed motives regime is an
affirmative defense affecting the remedies available to mixed-motive plaintiffs. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i}-(ii) (2000). Under what is sometimes called the "same
decision" defense, an employer who can show that it would have reached the same
decision even without the impermissible motivation can avoid all but equitable remedies. [d. See also Kelly Pierce, Comment. A Fire Without Smoke: The Elimination of the
182

183
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about the relative attractions of the mixed-motive and pretext
regimes, then the apparent casualness with which the Elsayed
court substitutes Costa v. Desert Palace for Reeves in amending
its opinion suggests that plaintiffs will have little trouble retooling pretext cases as mixed-motive cases.
However, this apparent easing of the way for employment
discrimination plaintiffs may prove deceptive. It is difficult to
see, for example, how Professor Elsayed will be any better off in
the retrial of his case under Desert Palace than he would have
been under Reeves. Though he can now prevail without showing his race was the real reason for the tenure decision against
him, he will nevertheless need to demonstrate that his race
was a motivating factor, and the causal link may prove just as
difficult to establish as pretext. 1S4 He will still need to rely on
circumstantial evidence to make his case, and presumably
without the aid of the McDonnell Douglas device for framing
the question and ordering the evidence. Deficient scholarship
was the reason the University offered for its tenure denial, and
Professor Elsayed argued this reason was pretextual. It is far
from clear that he would have an easier time proving his race
played a motivating part in the tenure decision though his
scholarship was deficient, even if he would be willing to concede as much. In McDonnell Douglas, where the company's
proffered reason for refusing to rehire Percy Green was his
"unlawful, disruptive acts" against it, would Green have been
better off arguing on remand that his race played a motivating
part than that the employer's concern was pretextual? As applied to facts of cases, pretext and mixed-motive analysis often
come out about the same. 1S5
Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2198 (2003).
184 Causation in mixed motive cases bristles with its own interpretive difficulties,
as anyone who has ever tried actually to read the famously fractured Price Waterlwuse
opinion will attest. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View
of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
1029 (1995) (demonstrating the difficulties entailed in analyzing the facts of particular
cases under a mixed motive regime).
185 "It is ... possible to say that all cases are mixed motive ones: even McDonnellBurdine cases are predicated on the existence of discriminatory motivations, and the
employer's articulation of a nondiscrimintory reason does not negate the possibility
that discrimination motivated the decision. It merely offers an alternative motivation
that may (or may not) be more plausible than the inference of discrimination." Charles
Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title
VII, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1107, 1162 (1991).
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When Dr. Wellman gave his opinion in Elsayed, drawing
the inference of discrimination for the jury, he actually phrased
his conclusion in mixed-motive language rather than pretext
language: "[R]ace played a very important factor in the decision
to deny Professor Elsayed tenure."186 If, as this suggests, Dr.
Wellman would be comfortable applying his decoding methodology in a mixed-motive context, the question arises whether
his testimony would fare better with the court on retrial under
a mixed-motive regime. More generally, will the mixed-motive
context prove friendlier to subtle discrimination testimony than
the pretext context has shown itself to be in Elsayed?
No expert testimony was offered in Desert Palace itself. In
Price Waterhouse, however, which was the seminal mixedmotive case, psychology professor Dr. Susan Fiske testified as
an expert on sex stereotyping. 187 The admissibility of her testimony was not at issue, as the defendants did not object to it.
Still, it is possible to infer from the opinion that the testimony
might have had trouble passing muster if it had been at issue.
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, seemed to question
the relevance of Dr. Fiske's testimony, though benignly disposed toward it. Brennan was "tempted," as he said, to say
that Dr. Fiske's testimony was "merely icing on [plaintiff] Hopkins' cake," since "[i]t takes no special training to discern sex
stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee
as requiring 'a course in charm school.'"188 Justice Kennedy,
dissenting, patently found Fiske's testimony unreliable: "The
plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should
have no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part
in any decision. "189
Nevertheless, it seems clear that in a mixed-motive context, testimony such as Dr. Fiske's, which focused on the written statements of decision-makers and drew only the inference
of sexism, would not necessarily trigger the Kumho Catch-22
discussed above. 190 That is, unlike Dr. Wellman in Elsayed, Dr.
Fiske in Price Waterhouse could satisfy the as-applied reliabil186 Appellee's Brief at 55. Defendants note that Dr. Wellman "misstated this legal
principle." Appellants' Opening Brief at 44.
187 Charles Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII. 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1107, 1148 (1991).
188 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
189 Id. at 294 n.5.
190 See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
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ity test under Kumho, applying her method to particular facts
of the case, without triggering the rule against offering legal
conclusions to the jury.191 This is because the causal link remains to be drawn between the sexism present in the employer's statements and the actual decision in the adverse employment action at issue. The Price Waterhouse court showed
how the causal inference could be drawn:
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations
from all of the firm's partners; that it generally relied very
heavily on such evaluations in making its decision; that some
of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping;
and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on these particular comments, either in Hopkins' case or in the past. Certainly a plausible ... conclusion to draw from this set of circumstances is that the Policy Board in making its decision did
in fact take into account all of the partners' comments, including the comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women's proper deportment. 192

Though the difference may at first seem simply to be a difference between Dr. Fiske's methodology and Dr. Wellman's
methodology, a more fundamental difference can be located in
the departure of the mixed-motive regime from the traditional
McDonnell Douglas pretext regime. Discussing Miles u. M.N.C.
Corp., a precursor to the Price Waterhouse case, legal scholar
Charles Sullivan analyzes the way the mixed-motive cases
came to branch off from the McDonnell Douglas regime. 193 In
Miles, there was "direct evidence" of discriminatory intent
where a manager said the company did not hire blacks because
"half of them weren't worth a shit."194 In cases like Miles, explains Sullivan, where intent is first found by direct evidence,
it becomes important to establish the causal link between discriminatory intent and the plaintiff's injury.195 These cases became known as "mixed motive" cases "because the issue was
whether permissible or impermissible motives 'caused' the de191 Note that Price Waterlwuse was decided ten years before Kumlw. See Price
Waterlwuse, 490 U.S. at 228; Kumlw, 526 U.S. at 137.
192 Price Waterlwuse, 490 U.S. at 1794.
193 Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1118.
th
194 Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 874 (11
Cir. 1985).
196 Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1118.
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cision at issue."196 In McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand,
where employer conduct is the basis of the inference of discrimination, the question of causation is "subsumed" in the
question of whether to draw the inference. 197
As Sullivan's analysis suggests, mixed-motive cases have
tended to feature incriminating statements by the employer.198
Such statements can be decoded, if decoding is required, without reaching the ultimate legal conclusion of discrimination.
Where the inference of discrimination is drawn from the employer's conduct, as in Elsayed, it will prove much more difficult to perform the decoding without offering a legal conclusion.
Thus, even though Desert Palace has withdrawn the directevidence requirement imposed by the courts under Price
Waterhouse, permitting cases like Elsayed to be framed as
mixed-motive cases, subtle discrimination testimony based on
employer conduct will still have trouble passing muster under
the expert testimony rules without triggering the legal conclusion prohibition.
D.

THE REHABILITATION OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
DESERT PALACE

In lifting the direct-evidence requirement for mixed-motive
Title VII employment discrimination cases, Desert Palace de-

Id.
197Id.
198 According to Kelly Pierce, most courts determine whether a case will proceed
as a mixed-motive case or as pretext case based on whether the plaintiff can produce
direct evidence. Kelly Pierce, Comment. A Fire Without Smoke: The Elimination of the
Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2185-2186 (2003). However, Pierce
points out that the circuits are thoroughly split on a definition of direct evidence. Id. at
2186. Charles Sullivan declares "direct evidence" a "misnomer," pointing out that even
in Miles, an inference must be drawn to find that the employer's obvious animus motivated the employment decision. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1119. In a general way,
though, it is safe to say that "direct evidence" is used to characterize statements rather
than conduct: "IT]estimony of employers or their admissions are analyzed under Price
Waterhouse; inferences of bad thoughts drawn from conduct are treated under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Where admissions are concerned, the plaintiff must convince the fact-finder that bad thoughts not only existed but also influenced the decision
maker. To the extent that the plaintiffs proof rests on inferences drawn from the employer's conduct, however, all three stages collapse into one: does the conduct which, by
definition, affects the plaintiff, reveal the existence of prohibited considerations?" Id.
at 1157.
196
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livered a short lesson concerning the use of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases generally:
We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. [citation omitted], we recognized that evidence that a defendant's explanation for an
employment practice is 'unworthy of credence' is 'one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.' [citation omitted]. The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deeprooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but
may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence."199

The Court went on to point out that circumstantial evidence has always been considered sufficient in court, even in
criminal cases, where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 20o It is not surprising, then, said the Court, that neither
the employer in this case nor its amici curiae can point to any
other circumstance in which the Court has required a showing
of direct evidence without an affirmative statutory directive. 201
It is worth speculating about why and how such a mystification has uniquely grown up around and enshrouded discrimination jurisprudence. As suggested above, one reason for
the unwillingness to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence in employment discrimination cases may be a growing
reluctance to embrace the explanatory presumption of discrimination on which the McDonnell Douglas regime is
founded. 202 If this is so, then the brisk demystifying language of
the Desert Palace dictum concerning circumstantial evidence
may prove to be limited to its rhetorical effect.

199

Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94.

201

[d. at 95.
[d.

202

Selmi, supra note 11, at 328.

200
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CONCLUSION

In Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University Hayward, the experiment of introducing sociological "subtle discrimination" research into the courtroom has yielded ambiguous results. Under the two-prong Daubert test for expert testimony, questions were raised both about the relevance and
about the reliability of Dr. Wellman's testimony that the court
declined to address directly, ostensibly wishing to leave to the
trial court the issue of admissibility proper. Nor is it clear how
much of the difficulty encountered in this case had to do with
the specific structure of Wellman's methodology, his decoding
device. Given the unusual character of employment discrimination under McDonnell Douglas as a cause of action without
elements, it seems desirable not to have a racial-discrimination
expert draw the inference of discrimination for the jury. And
yet, in the post-Kumho world - where it is necessary for an expert to demonstrate not only why tires fail but also why this
particular tire failed - it is difficult to see how this trap can be
avoided.
The Supreme Court decision in Desert Palace arose out of a
Ninth Circuit case, virtually contemporaneous with Elsayed,
which was introduced into the Elsayed opinion by amendment.
Desert Palace has aroused a good deal of speculation as to
whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext regime is simply obsolete and due to expire. 203 Of course, it is much too early to tell
whether, in fact, the mixed-motive analysis will come to displace pretext analysis, now that the direct evidence hobble has
been removed. For Professor Elsayed, as argued above, it certainly is not clear that the mixed-motives route would provide
an advantage over the pretext route.
In her influential 1995 article, Professor Malamud called
for an end to the McDonnell Douglas regime in the name of
"intellectual honesty" and for the sake of encouraging "a more
subtle and creative understanding of discrimination in its
many forms.''204 She noted, however, that to abandon McDonnell Douglas would be to remove a constraint on the appellate

203
204

See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 198, at 2207-2209.
Malamud, supra note 7, at 2320.
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courts, empowering them to "attempt to expand their own role
by establishing 'rules' about the kinds of evidence that will and
will not suffice to prove intentional discrimination as a matter
oflaw."205 Given the way the appellate court performed its role
in Elsayed, perhaps we are not ready for the greater openness
Desert Palace seems to promise. For McDonnell Douglas itself
once promised openness. John Valery White claims that "the
Court's plan in McDonnell Douglas was to avoid defining both
discrimination and the protected categories so that the law
might accommodate the many forms of both, while creating a
structure within which justice could be administered."206 If this
characterization is persuasive, then it casts a cautionary light
back over the convolutions and mystifications of Title VII employment discrimination jurisprudence. 207 If the Elsayed court
is representative, then we will not do well to invite the federal
appellate courts to start over again with a clean slate. The
mystification is not in the doctrine but in the doctrine's keepers.
DEBORAH DYSON'

200

[d. at 2323.

White, supra note 149, at 720.
"For better or for worse, the traditional disparate treatment model, relied on
by the courts for the last thirty years, remains the best model for proving claims of
discrimination," says Michael Selmi, "though by labeling it the best model I do not
mean to suggest that it is a perfect model." Selmi, supra note 11, at 666 .
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